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Abstract
We consider the definition that might be given to the time at which
a particle arrives at a given place, both in standard quantum theory
and also in Bohmian mechanics. We discuss an ambiguity that arises
in the standard theory in three, but not in one, spatial dimension.
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1 Introduction
In classical mechanics, a particle can be said to follow a definite trajec-
tory, and so it is clear what is meant by the time at which a particle ar-
rives in a given place. If one considers an ensemble of particles, it is then
easy to say what is meant by a distribution of arrival times. In standard
quantum theory, on the other hand, particles are not said to follow tra-
jectories, and so the meaning of arrival time in quantum theory has been
rather controversial. Some elements of this controversy include statements
such as “the time-of-arrival cannot be precisely defined and measured in
quantum mechanics” (quoted from [1]; see also [2, 3, 4]); statements that
time-of-arrival must be definable, for example “Since the distribution of ar-
rival times at a given spatial point is, in principle, a measurable quantity
that can be determined via a time-of-flight experiment, it is reasonable to
ask for an apparatus-independent theoretical prediction” [5]; specific propos-
als for defining a time-of-arrival distribution (for example, in [6, 7, 8]), and
suggestions (for example, in [7] and [9]) that experiments could determine
which if any of these proposals is correct.
In the causal theory of Bohm [10, 11], particles do follow definite trajecto-
ries, and so the definition of arrival-time distributions is again unambiguous.
Leavens, most recently in [12], has studied the arrival-time distribution of
a free particle in Bohmian theory, and found results which differ from the
proposal made in [7]. Deotto and Ghirardi [13], and also Holland [14] have
proposed what I shall call Bohm-like theories: theories in which particles
follow trajectories which differ from the trajectories of Bohmian theory, but
which nevertheless reproduce all of the observational results of standard
quantum theory, in the same way that Bohmian theory does. In this paper
I will study a simple example of a Bohm-like theory, and demonstrate that
in certain cases this theory will produce arrival-time distributions which are
different that those produced by (standard) Bohmian theory. I will also use
this same demonstration to discuss, quite apart from any consideration of
Bohmian theory, an ambiguity in the meaning of arrival-time distributions
for three-dimensional problems within standard quantum theory.
I begin by using terminology which is appropriate is classical mechanics.
Consider a particle with position coordinates (x, y, z), which at the initial
time t = 0 has x < 0. Let S+ denote the region of space in which x ≥ 0,
S− the region in which x < 0, and S0 the x = 0 plane. Let T be the first
time after t = 0 at which the particle arrives at S0 (equivalently, crosses
from S− to S+); by definition, T > 0. I will mostly be concerned with the
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integrated arrival-time distribution, which I denote as P (t); that is, P (t) is
the probability that T ≤ t.
The question to be discussed is whether this distribution P can be pre-
cisely and unambiguously defined in quantum theory. If it can be, it could
be expected to satisfy, at least, the following properties:
i) P (t) is monotonically increasing: P (t) ≥ P (t′) for t ≥ t′ ≥ 0.
ii) Define A(t) = dP (t)/dt; from i), we have A(t) ≥ 0. Then A(t)dt repre-
sents the probability that T = t.
iii) Let T be the average value of T (averaged over those cases in which the
particle does eventually arrive at S0). From ii), this is given by
T =
∫∞
0
t A(t) dt∫∞
0
A(t) dt
(1)
This can be re-written, with P∞ := limt→∞ P (t), as
T =
∫∞
0
dt [P∞ − P (t)]
P∞
(2)
iv) Now let Q(t) be the probability that the particle would be found, at
time t, in S+; that is,
Q(t) =
∫ ∫ ∫
|Ψ(x, y, z, t)|2 θ(x) dx dy dz. (3)
The initial condition we are assuming means that Q(t = 0) = 0. We
expect that
P (t) ≥ Q(t). (4)
If the particle could surely be found in S+ at time t if it had arrived
there at time t′ (with 0 ≤ t′ ≤ t), then the relation (4) could be
replaced by an equality.
v) From i) and iv), we have
P (t) ≥ max
t≥t′≥0
Q(t′). (5)
In the next section I will present an example in which a Bohm-like theory
produces a different result for P (t) than does the usual Bohmian theory. The
implications of this example are discussed in the final section.
3
2 Example
Consider a free (V = 0) particle which, at the initial time t = 0, is described
by the following minimum-uncertainty wave packet centered at the point
x = −x1, y = 0, z = 0:
Ψ(x, y, z, t = 0) =
[
1
π3a2b2c2
] 1
4
exp[ikx] exp
[
−(x+ x1)
2
2a2
]
× exp
[
− y
2
2b2
]
exp
[
− z
2
2c2
]
, (6)
where a, b, c, and k are positive constants, and where I have set both the
mass of the particle and the value of h¯ to one. We want the particle to start
out with x < 0; this corresponds to x1 > 0. Strictly speaking, this wave
packet does not satisfy the condition Q(t = 0) = 0, because its tail extends
to positive values of x. However, Q(0) can be made arbitrarily small by
taking (x1/a) large (see Eq. 9 below).
Define α = (a2 + it)
1
2 ; β = (b2 + it)
1
2 ; γ = (c2 + it)
1
2 . Then
Ψ(x, y, z, t) =
[
a2b2c2
π3
] 1
4 exp[i(kx− k2t/2)]
αβγ
exp
[
−(x+ x1 − kt)
2
2α2
]
× exp
[
− y
2
2β2
]
exp
[
− z
2
2γ2
]
. (7)
At time t, the center of the wave packet is at x = −x1 + kt (with x1 > 0
and k > 0), y = z = 0. It is straightforward to calculate
Q(t) = 1
2
erfc(η), (8)
where η := a(x1 − kt)/|α|2, and erfc is the complementary error function:
erfc(η) = 2π−
1
2
∫∞
η exp(−ξ2) dξ. It follows from Eq. 8 that
Q(0) = 1
2
erfc(x1/a), (9)
and that
lim
t→∞
Q(t) = 1
2
erfc(−ak). (10)
We see from (10) that Q does not approach one even as t → ∞; this is
because the wave packet spreads out as its center moves toward large x, so
that a finite fraction of the tail of the packet remains in S−.
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In Bohmian theory [10, 11] the particle is considered to have a definite
position, which will be denoted as r = (X,Y,Z). Let vb denote the Bohmian
velocity of the particle (that is, vb = dr/dt); then if we write Ψ = R exp(iS),
in Bohmian theory vb is given by
vb = ∇S (11)
It then follows that
∇ · (|Ψ|2vb) = −∂|Ψ|
2
∂t
(12)
In fact, the product (|Ψ|2vb) is just the usual quantum probability current,
and Eq. 12 is just the equation of conservation of probability in standard
quantum theory. One associates with a given wave function Ψ an ensemble
of particles, whose distribution agrees with the quantum probability den-
sity |Ψ|2; Eq. 12 assures that this agreement, if it exists at the initial time,
persists for all time, and this in turn means that Bohmian theory will repro-
duce all of the experimental predictions of standard quantum theory [15].
Thus Bohmian theory is not in conflict with, but rather is a completion of,
standard quantum theory.
Since each particle in the Bohmian ensemble follows a definite trajectory,
the interpretation of arrival-time distributions is unambiguous. The quan-
tity P (t) defined above is simply the fraction of particles in the ensemble
which have X ≥ 0 for any time t′ with 0 ≤ t′ ≤ t, and of course Q(t) is the
fraction which have X ≥ 0 at time t. For the wave function in Eq. 7, the
components of the Bohmian velocity turn out to be
vbx(X,Y,Z, t) = [k + (X + x1)t]/|α|4, (13)
vby(X,Y,Z, t) = Y t/|β|4, (14)
vbz(X,Y,Z, t) = Zt/|γ|4, (15)
Since x1 > 0, we see from Eq. 13 that, for all t ≥ 0,
vbx(X = 0, Y, Z, t) > 0 (16)
This means that if the particle does enter S+, it can never leave. Since that
was the condition which gives equality in the relation (4), we see that in this
example, Bohmian theory gives
P (t) = Q(t), (17)
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where Q(t) is given by Eq. 8.
Because of the factorized form of Ψ in this example, the x-component
of the Bohmian motion is the same as in the one-dimensional example of a
minimum-uncertainty packet studied in [12]. In fact we can, without having
to solve for the Bohmian trajectories in detail, recover one of the main results
of [12], namely that a finite fraction of the Bohmian ensemble never makes
it to the region S+. That fraction is just (1 − P∞); by Eq. 17 this equals
(1− limt→∞Q(t)), which we saw in Eq. 10 is not zero.
It is Eq. 12 which insures, for Bohmian theory, that an ensemble of
particles with initial distribution given by |Ψ|2 reproduces the experimental
predictions of standard quantum theory. One can formulate an alternative
theory, which I will refer to as a Bohm-like theory, in which a particle again
has a definite position, but in which the velocity (call it vbl) may differ from
the Bohmian velocity vb (given in Eq. 11). Let δv denote the difference
between vbl and vb:
vbl = vb + δv (18)
Then in order for this Bohm-like theory to agree with standard quantum
theory in the same sense that Bohmian theory does, one must require that
vbl also satisfy Eq. 12; that is, one must require
∇ · (|Ψ|2δv) = 0. (19)
Deotto and Ghirardi [13] have shown that it is possible to choose vbl in such
a way as to satisfy several requirements that one may reasonably expect, in
particular what they call “genuine” Galilean covariance. I will consider a
simplified form of the theory suggested in [13]; I will take
δv = λ(∇|Ψ|2)× vb, (20)
where λ is a constant and vb is still given by Eq. 11; vbl is then given by
Eq. 18. This vbl will certainly not satisfy all of the requirements imposed
in [13]; I will argue in the next section that this makes this simple example
of a Bohm-like theory implausible, but not demonstrably incorrect. For
now, I will proceed to discuss the consequences of the choice (20). This
choice does at least satisfy Eq. 19; to see that, note that vb = ∇S and that
∇ · (|Ψ|2∇|Ψ|2 ×∇S) vanishes identically for any |Ψ|2 and any S.
It is possible to discuss the distribution P (t) that this Bohm-like the-
ory will imply for the example given by Eq. 7 without having to find the
trajectories explicitly. If it were the case that the x-component of vbl were
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positive everywhere on the plane S0 for all times t ≥ 0, we could conclude
that P (t) = Q(t), just as we did in Eq. 17 for the standard Bohmian the-
ory. As we shall see below, if this condition on the x-component of vbl is
not satisfied, then this Bohm-like theory will necessarily imply a different
distribution P (t) than does standard Bohmian theory. From Eqs. 7, 14, 15,
and 20, the x-component of δv at X = 0 is
δvx(0, Y, Z, t) = 2λ|Ψ(0, Y, Z.t)|2(c2 − b2)Y Zt/(|β|4|γ|4), (21)
while from Eq. 13,
vbx(0, Y, Z, t) = (k + x1t)/|α|4. (22)
Let me now take λ > 0 and (c2 − b2) < 0. Then in the two quadrants of
the plane S0 with the product Y Z negative, δvx will be positive, and since
vbx is positive everywhere on S0, we will have vblx (= vbx + δvx) > 0. On
the other hand, in the quadrants with Y Z positive, δvx is negative, and so
vblx will be positive if and only if |δvx| ≤ vbx. For a fixed value of t, the
maximum value of |δvx(0,X, Y, t)| occurs at the points Y = ±|β|2/(
√
2b),
Z = ±|γ|2/(√2c). This maximum value is
|δvx|max = λ a(b
2 − c2)t
π
3
2 e|α|2|β|4|γ|4
exp
[
−a2(x1 − kt)2
|α|4
]
. (23)
From Eq. 23, |δvx|max is zero at t = 0 and is proportional to t−4 as t→∞,
while from Eq. 22, vbx is non-zero at t = 0 and is proportional to t
−1 as
t → ∞. Therefore it is possible to have a value of λ sufficiently small so
that |δvx|max < vbx for all times t ≥ 0. In that case, vblx would be positive
everywhere on S0 for all t ≥ 0, and so the values of P (t) in this Bohm-like
theory and in the standard Bohmian theory would agree.
Now let me take λ to be sufficiently large so that |δvx|max > vbx for
some time t > 0. This means that, for some values of Y , Z, and t,
vblx(0, Y, Z, t) < 0, which implies that some members of the Bohmian en-
semble are returning from S+ to S−. Let tr be within an interval of time in
which this return is occurring. At any time t, the fraction of the ensemble
in S+ equals Q(t), but at tr there is an additional fraction of “returned”
members, which are in S− at tr but were in S+ at some time prior to tr.
This means that P (tr) (which is the total fraction of ensemble members that
were in S+ at any time t
′ ≤ t) must be greater than Q(tr).
To be certain of this conclusion, we must show that, of the ensemble
members which returned from S+ prior to tr, at least a finite fraction still
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are in S− at tr. Let D be an open, bounded region of the plane S0, such that
at every point of D and for an interval of time around tr, vblx is negative;
such a region must exist, if λ is sufficiently large. For sufficiently small ǫ, it
must be possible to find a subset Dǫ ⊂ D such that the distance between
any point in Dǫ and any point on S0 not in D is at least ǫ. Now it can
be shown that, for Y and Z bounded, the magnitude of the component of
vbl parallel to S0 is bounded, independently of X and t; call such a bound
|v‖|max. Thus any member of the ensemble which returns to S− through
Dǫ must spent at least an amount of time τ = ǫ/|v‖|max in S− (because it
takes at least time τ for it to clear the region D). Thus all members of the
ensemble which return to S− through Dǫ in the time interval [tr− τ, tr] will
still be in S− at time tr.
We therefore see that, with the wave function as given in Eq. 7, the
Bohm-like theory defined by Eq. 20 with a sufficiently-large value of λ will
imply that P (t) > Q(t), for some values of t. Since with this wave function
the standard Bohmian theory gives P (t) = Q(t) for all t, we conclude that
these two theories can give different arrival-time distributions P (t).
3 Discussion
The choice for δv made in Eq. 20 does not respect many of the conditions
set out by Deotto and Ghirardi [13]. For example, the cross product of two
vectors is a pseudo vector, although a velocity must of course be a true
vector. To take this choice seriously, one would have to say that Eq. 20
is only valid in a particular coordinate system; if you want to know δv in
some other coordinate system, use Eq. 20 to calculate it in the particular
system, and then transform. Deotto and Ghirardi require that there not be
any preferred coordinate system; while this requirement is certainly quite
reasonable, it is not, strictly speaking, necessary. As long as the Bohm-
like theory reproduces the observational consequences of standard quantum
theory, the preferred coordinate system remains hidden; its existence can be
neither confirmed nor refuted by any experimental result.
Still, Deotto and Ghirardi, and in a different way Holland [14], have
shown that is is possible to formulate a Bohm-like theory which is consid-
erably more plausible than the one defined by Eq. 20. It is certainly an
important question for the program of studying Bohmian theories, to judge
which of the possible alternatives for the particle velocity is the most plau-
sible. However, plausibility is not an issue we must be concerned with here.
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One could certainly criticize the calculations presented here, because of the
implausibility of the choice (20) or for that matter because the condition
Q(0) = 0 is not strictly satisfied. The calculation presented here does have
the virtue of simplicity, and it is hard to believe that the result obtained
(that P (t) differs from that implied by the standard Bohmian theory) is an
artifact either of the transformation properties of Eq. 20 or of the (arbi-
trarily small) tail of the initial wave function. Rather, this result gives one
confidence to conjecture that for any Bohm-like theory (with non-trivial δv)
there exists an example of a wave function with Q(0) = 0 exactly, for which
that theory and standard Bohmian theory yield different P (t).
The example presented here does not imply any additional ambiguity
within the Bohmian program, beyond that already recognized in [13] and
[14]. It is obvious that, when theories make different choices for δv, there
will be some quantities for which those theories will imply different results.
What this example does show is that such theories will differ on a quantity,
namely the distribution of arrival times, that one might have hoped would be
definable strictly in terms of the wave function, and so would be independent
of any particular completion of standard quantum theory.
To discuss this matter further, let us consider to what extent the demon-
stration by Leavens [12], that results from Bohmian theory disagree with
those from the theory of Grot, Rovelli, and Tate [7], should be counted as
evidence against the latter theory. If one is committed to believing in the
truth of Bohmian theory, one will consider as incorrect anything which dis-
agrees with it. But even if one has no such commitment, one might be at
least suspicious of any result expressed solely in terms of the wave function
which disagrees with the Bohmian result, not because the Bohmian the-
ory is necessarily correct, but just because it might be. Certainly there are
quantities which can be precisely defined and calculated within Bohmian
theory, to which standard quantum theory assigns no meaning. However,
to the extent that Bohmian theory can be considered a completion of stan-
dard quantum theory, one might expect that, for any quantity that can be
calculated within standard quantum theory, the Bohmian calculation would
agree. Similarly, one might expect any quantity calculable from the wave
function to agree with all completions (including any that might be judged
implausible). As we have seen, for the distribution of arrival times this is
not possible.
Of course, if one asks about the results of a particular experiment de-
signed to measure times of arrival, quantum theory should be able to give
an unambiguous answer, and Bohmian theory as well as any Bohm-like the-
9
ory should agree with that answer. The issue we are considering is whether
that answer can be stated, within standard quantum theory, in a way which
is independent of the particular way in which the arrival times are to be
measured. In standard quantum theory, no result is meaningful unless it is
measured; the quantityQ(t) defined in Eq. 3 must be interpreted as the prob-
ability that the particle be found in S+ at time t, rather than the probability
that it is there. Nevertheless, we do not have to consider the particular way
in which the particle’s position is measured; in terms of Bohm-like theories,
we can say that they all must agree on the quantity Q(t). One might have
thought that P (t) would enjoy the same status; after all, P (t) is, roughly
speaking, like the disjunction of Q(t′) for 0 ≤ t′ ≤ t. Unfortunately, a deter-
mination of position at one time will disturb the determination at any other
time, and different Bohm-like theories, while constrained to have identical
ensembles of positions at any one time, differ precisely because they have
different trajectories.
The ambiguity in the time-of-arrival distribution revealed by the example
discussed here would not be present in a one-dimensional example. The ana-
logue of Eq. 19 for one dimension, namely ∂(|Ψ|2δv)/∂x = 0, together with
suitable boundary conditions, would require δv = 0. One would expect that
general arguments for or against the definability of the arrival-time distribu-
tion, such as those quoted at the beginning of this paper, would be equally
cogent in one and in three dimensions. It does seem, however, that there is
an ambiguity in three dimensions which is not apparent if one only considers
one-dimensional examples. Perhaps one dimension is misleadingly simple;
one may be tempted by the isomorphism between configuration space and
temporal space to ignore the special role played by time in non-relativistic
quantum mechanics.
The discussion above has been within the context of Bohmian and Bohm-
like theories, but many of the same points can be put entirely within the
context of standard quantum theory, by considering the quantum probability
current (to be denoted J). As Squires has pointed out [16], the freedom
to chose alternative expressions for the velocity in Bohm-like theories is
a direct reflection of the under-determination of the quantum probability
current in more than one spatial dimension. Mielnik [3] suggested that a
reasonable first guess for a time-of-arrival density would be the component
of J normal to the arrival surface; in our case this would mean identifying
Jx(x = 0, y, z, t) as the probability for arriving at the point (0, y, z) at time
t. Mielnik then went on to show that this could not be correct in general,
since there must exist examples in which this component becomes negative.
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It is sometimes suggested (for example, in [8]) that Jx does indeed give the
correct arrival time density, in those cases in which it is always positive.
Let Jc denote the customary form for the quantum probability current
(which is just the product of |Ψ|2 with vb which is given in Eq. 11); then
without now identifying vb as the velocity of anything, we can see from
Eq. 16 that for the wave function given in Eq. 7, Jcx is indeed positive
everywhere on the plane S0. So, if we follow the above suggestion, we would
say that Jcx(x = 0, y, z, t) does indeed give the arrival-time density for this
wave function.
Now define Jl to be (|Ψ|2vbl), where vbl is given by Eqs. 18 and 20 (and
also need not be identified as the velocity of anything). Then from Eqs. 12
and 19 it follows that
∇ · Jl = −∂|Ψ|
2
∂t
, (24)
which means that we can, if we wish, violate custom and call Jl (instead of
Jc) the quantum probability current. So we might as well say that Jlx gives
the arrival-time density, in those cases in which Jlx is always positive.
The calculations of the previous section show that, for the wave function
given in Eq. 7, if λ happens to be small enough, then Jlx is positive every-
where on S0. So, for small enough λ, the two possibilities for the probability
current (Jc and Jl) give us two possibilities for the arrival-time density (Jcx
and Jlx) which disagree with each other [17]. One certainly can make an
arbitrary choice between Jc and Jl, that is, one can pick either one of them
and choose to define that one to be the probability current. That choice,
however, does not have any experimental implications—no experimental re-
sult can depend upon which definition one happens to make—so it would
not make sense to expect the choice to be either confirmed or refuted by any
experiment. More generally, one certainly can (and sometimes one does [7])
identify some quantity which can be calculated purely in terms of the wave
function, and choose to call that quantity a time-of-arrival distribution. One
can then discuss the question of whether this quantity does have [7] or does
not have [18] properties that one might intuitively expect such a distribu-
tion to have. However, one should not then expect that any experiment will
confirm the felicity of that choice.
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